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Abstract
Both neurobiological and environmental factors are known to play a role in the origin of
schizophrenia, but no model has been proposed that accounts for both. This work presents
a functional model of schizophrenia that merges psychodynamic elements with ingredients
borrowed from the theory of psychological traumas, and evidences the interplay of traumatic
experiences and defective mental functions in the pathogenesis of the disorder. Our model
foresees that dissociation is a standard tool used by the mind to protect itself from emotional
pain. In case of repeated traumas, the mind learns to adopt selective forms of dissociation
to avoid pain without losing touch with external reality. We conjecture that this process
is defective in schizophrenia, where dissociation is either too weak, giving rise to positive
symptoms, or too strong, causing negative symptoms.
1 Theories on schizophrenia
Mental disorders can be described at multiple levels: psychological, neurobiological, genetic. In
this work we deal with another level, that we call functional, situated between the psycholog-
ical and the neurobiological levels. The functional level aims to characterise the structure of
the system under investigation and the function of each component, regardless of its neurobi-
ological implementation. This is the scientific approach of Artificial Life: study life as it could
be, to understand life as it is. This work presents a functional model of schizophrenia, which is
used to interpret the psychological-symptomatic aspects of the disorder and to account for the
neurobiological substrate.
Both genetic and environmental factors, such as traumatic experiences, are known to play a
role in the origin of schizophrenia, but few models have been proposed that account for both. The
model we are going to propose merges psychodynamic elements with ingredients borrowed from
the theory of psychological traumas, and evidences the interplay of traumatic experiences and
defective mental functions in the pathogenesis of schizophrenia. A thorough characterisation of
this complex condition is outside the scope of this work: our model, based on a simplification of
reality, has the purpose to interpret some limited aspects of mental functioning.
Among theories of schizophrenia, much attention has been dedicated to the ‘dopamine hy-
pothesis’ (Howes and Kapur, 2009). Psychosis is hypothesised to be caused by the phenomenon
of ‘aberrant salience’ (Kapur, 2003), determined by an excess of neurotransmitter dopamine in
the limbic system. This theory is supported by the fact that amphetamines, which trigger the
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2 A MODEL FOR THE MIND
release of dopamine, may induce hallucinations and delusions (Laruell et al., 1996) and that an-
tipsychotic drugs block the D2 dopamine receptor. However, large genetic studies were unable to
identify schizophrenia-associated genes involved in dopamine transmission (Alexis et al., 2016).
Another theory links schizophrenia to a malfunction of glutamate NMDA receptors which,
unlike dopamine receptors, are distributed across the whole brain (Javitt, 2010). This theory is
based on the observation that some drugs (such as PCP) that block the NMDA receptor, produce
symptoms similar to those of schizophrenia. Unlike amphetamines, such drugs would be able to
reproduce the full spectrum of schizophrenia symptoms (positive, cognitive, negative).
Connections between neurons are created at a very high pace during postnatal development,
to reach their maximum density around age six. Many connections are subsequently eliminated
during the ‘pruning’ phase which, for prefrontal cortex, peaks in late adolescence, a period that
corresponds to the onset of most schizophrenia cases. A recent genetic study (Sekar et al., 2016)
found a correlation between psychosis and a gene coding for a receptor that targets synapses for
destruction by the immune system. According to the study’s authors, the gene variant would
cause excessive pruning and lead to schizophrenia. However, the defective gene is only present
in a small minority of patients.
A history of childhood traumas is reported to be a risk factor for schizophrenia. The content of
positive symptoms is coherent with low self-esteem and negative affect, which are the common
outcome of adverse childhood experiences (Schaefer and Fisher, 2011). The effect of traumas
could be mediated and amplified by enhanced susceptibility (Horan and Blanchard, 2003; Cohen
and Docherty, 2004). The rest of the paper is organised as follows: the model is introduced in sec-
tion 2 and 3, and used in section 4 to obtain an interpretation of some aspects of schizophrenia;
section 5 draws the conclusions and outlines future research directions.
2 A model for the mind
Relational value
Reality can be conceived as a set of situations, each characterised through a list of active fea-
tures. Examples of simple perceptual features are: ‘round shape’, ‘horizontal orientation’, ‘red
color’. Examples of more abstract features are: ‘black ducks’, ‘soccer players’, ‘being a teacher’.
Feature activation and deactivation is a continuous process, driven by perceptual features fed
from sensory stimuli and propagated to more abstract ones in real time. This occurs on a fast
time scale, as the mind ‘navigates’ through everyday life. For instance, if a person is walking on
the beach, the features encoding the concepts of ‘sand’ and ‘sun’ may be active, while features
such as ‘office chair’ and ‘computer screen’ are likely to be inactive.
We postulate that features are characterised by a property called relational value, that
can be either positive or negative. Features such as ‘honesty’ and ‘health’, for example, are
considered positive, while features such as ‘deception’ and ‘illness’ are generally perceived as
negative. The determination and change of values happens by association: if a new feature with
unknown value is presented in association with positive (negative) features, it will assume a
positive (negative) connotation. Since a feature in general takes part in many associations, its
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Figure 1: Functional modules of the mind. The process of perception and memory formation starts with the activa-
tion of perceptual features triggered by external stimuli (input), proceeds with the addition of salience, continues with
the generation of emotions, and ends with a new feature association presented to consciousness and stored in episodic
memory. The same pathway is utilised when the record is recalled from memory and ‘played back’ to consciousness.
See text for details.
value will be determined by the combined effect of all associations. The value is a long term
property, expected to change on a slow time scale.
A model for the mind
The mind can be represented as a set of interacting functional modules (Fig. 1). Cognitive
features are activated by the input flow and fed (link 1 in the figure) to the relational value
module which adds value to active features and computes the value of two key symbols: self and
object. This enriched information is passed (3) to the emotional module, that responds with
an appropriate emotion. Features are also fed in parallel (2) to the salience and attention
module, which uses the information about the current task pursued by the executive module
(6) and the current emotional response (4) to produce features loaded with salience.
Salient features are passed to the associator (5), which binds them together and forms a
new association. This association (8) and the current emotional response (7) are sent to the
executive function, where consciousness is produced. The newly formed association in also stored
in episodic memory (9). Finally, the executive function, based on present (7,8) and past (10)
information, issues motor commands (11) and directs behaviour. The same pathway is triggered
during the process of recall (12), by which an existing record is retrieved from memory, brought
to consciousness and ‘played back’.
Based on current neurobiological knowledge, the processing of perceptual and abstract fea-
tures takes place in the cortex (e.g., occipital cortex for visual features). The relational and emo-
tional modules could be localised in the medial prefrontal, cingulate and insular cortex, which
are brain areas critical for social interaction (Palmiter, 2008; Etkin et al., 2011; Gu et al., 2013).
The salience module could map to the striatum, a region involved in reward mechanisms
(Martin-Soelch et al., 2001), in which dopamine is the dominant neurotransmitter. The associa-
tor corresponds to the hippocampus, a structure essential for memory formation. The executive
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Figure 2: Relational judgements and emotions. The relational module (on the left) adds value to features and
computes the value of four variables (sval, oval, ocsval, scoval), that can be either positive (P), neutral (0) or negative
(N). Based on the combination of these values, the emotional module (on the right) produces a specific emotion,
belonging to one of four emotional poles.
function may be implemented in the prefrontal cortex, while episodic memory is distributed
across the whole cortex.
The independence of the consciousness generation pathway from the memory formation path-
way is consistent with the findings of the research done on patient H.M. (Squire, 2009), who had
the hippocampus removed. Since then, he was unable to form new memories, but retained pre-
viously formed memories and was definitely capable of conscious awareness.
Value computation, emotions and salience
Social and hierarchical judgements play a central role in human behaviour. Emotions are often
produced as a reaction to the actions of another person within a relational context, and depend
on the appraisal of who is superior and who is inferior, who is right and who is wrong. The
relational value module (Fig. 2-left panel) assigns value to active features fed from the perceptual
apparatus and calculates four variables: sval (self value), oval (object value), ocsval (object
contribution to self value), scoval (self contribution to object value).
Self value sval and object value oval are in turn determined by the sum of the values of all
active features associated to them, sfvali and ofvali. In formulas (S is the sigmoid function, which
prevents values from exceeding a maximum threshold):
sval = S(
∑
i sfvali) oval = S(
∑
i ofvali)
Since the set of active features changes depending on the situation, so does the self value. There-
fore, in our model the self value (or self-esteem) is a spatio-temporally local concept: one person
Page 4
3 NORMAL AND TRAUMATIC CONTEXTS
can have a high self-esteem in a given situation and a low self-esteem in another one. We can
still define a global self-esteem as the mean self value across all situations.
Based on these variables, the emotional module (Fig. 2-right panel) generates an emotion.
Gratitude, for instance, is generated when sval and ocsval are both positive (in other words:
when the self value is positive thanks to an action done by the object). Shame is produced when
sval is negative and oval is positive (in other words: when the object is worthier than the self).
Disappointment is elicited when sval is negative (in other words: moment characterised by low
self-esteem).
Emotions can be grouped in four emotional poles: pole A (happiness, love); pole B (shame,
pain for rejection, guilt); pole C (disappointment, sadness); pole D (anger, contempt, envy). Pole
A and pole D are characterised by positive self value and are therefore called positive poles,
pole B and pole C are characterised by negative self value and are called negative poles.
The association of shame, guilt and sadness to a lower social status is confirmed by numerous
studies (Stevens and Price, 1996). Also the association of anger to a higher social status has been
recognised and studied (Tiedens, 2011). Other emotions, such as the fear of dying, appear to be
more primordial and independent of social appraisal.
Emotional experience is complemented by salience generation. Salience is a quality that
defines the relative importance or prominence of (and attention paid to) a feature with respect to
other features. In our model of brain architecture, salience is attached to features based on two
criteria. The first criterion is the degree of contribution of the feature to the emotion generated
(link 4 in Fig. 1). If, for instance, a person feels ashamed because he/she has bat ears, the feature
‘ears’ receives high salience. In other words, the salience module is telling the mind: ‘you are not
far from emotion E, which mostly depends on features X,Y: these are the features you need to
monitor if you want to experience /avoid emotion E’.
The second criterion for salience attribution is the relevance of the feature for the task cur-
rently pursued by the executive function (link 6). If, for instance, a person is looking for the
car key, all objects resembling keys get visual priority, while objects of different shapes are ig-
nored. In this case, the message is: ‘features X,Y are linked to objective O on your agenda: these
are the features you need to look at if you want to reach /avoid objective O’. The idea that neu-
rons in the limbic system encode two kinds of salience (emotional and motivational) is not new
(Bromberg-Martin et al., 2010).
3 Normal and traumatic contexts
Normal functioning
Let us define a situation as a set of features simultaneously active. Examples of situations are:
‘piano lesson with uncle’ (coactivated features: image of piano, image of hands on the keyboard,
sound of uncle’s voice, sound of piano, etc.); ‘tennis match with a friend’ (coactivated features:
image of racquet, image of opponent, sound of racquet hitting the ball, odour of sweat, etc.). Sit-
uations can be thought of as belonging to different contexts, such as ‘parent relation’, ‘romantic
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Figure 3: Normal and traumatic contexts. The middle panel shows the map of all contexts, the left and right panels
show the context plane for a non-traumatic and for a traumatic context respectively. Each point in the context plane
represent a situation (defined as sets of coativated features) and is associated to an emotion (whose intensity is
represented by the colour shade). In a normal context (left panel), the mind can switch smoothly between emotional
poles, no pole requires dissociation and the repertoire of emotions is fully accessible. In a traumatic context (right
panel), pole B and/or pole C are characterised by too intense emotional levels, and are inhibited. When the mind
happens to be in one of these poles (forbidden zone), dissociation intervenes. To avoid dissociation, the mind oscillates
between poles A and D, staying in each pole as long as the situation is prototypical for the pole. When the situation
drifts out of the free zone into the transition zone (shown in grey), splitting symptoms appear, and the mind switches
to the free zone of the other permitted pole.
relation’, ‘relation with schoolmates’, etc. (Fig. 3-mid panel). A context can be conveniently
represented on a plane, in which points correspond to individual situations (Fig. 3-left panel).
Each point is associated to an emotion and belongs to the ‘zone of influence’ of one of the four
emotional poles. Each pole originates from a point representing the most prototypical situation
associated to the pole, and extends towards less prototypical situations. The epicentre of Pole
D, for instance, may correspond to a situation-point characterised by an object behaving very
dishonestly, eliciting a very strong anger, while points further away may be characterised by a
better behaviour of the object (a pole ‘hosts’ more emotions and therefore in general has more
‘centres’: only one centre is shown in the figure for simplicity). We define a context ‘normal’ if
the highest emotional levels are not too high. In this condition the mind can switch smoothly
between all poles, experiencing different levels of the emotions associated to each pole (Fig. 3-left
panel).
Traumatic functioning: dissociation
The emotional poles that can be involved in a trauma are the negative poles B and C. In our
model, a trauma occurs when the intensity of the elicited emotions is too high: in case of pole B,
based on what we said in section 2, this requires the existence of an value gap between object
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and self (object worthier than self). This in turn requires that object-associated features have
on average a higher value than self-associated features. If a person with bat ears, big nose and
thin lips thinks that these features are very negative and he/she gets criticised or made fun of
for them, a trauma may take place.
Upon the occurrence of a trauma, the associator stops working: this corresponds to the phe-
nomenon of dissociation, defined as the distortion, limitation or loss of the normal associative
links between perceptions, emotions, thoughts and behaviour. Dissociation can take the form of
mental ‘black-out’, depersonalisation (feeling of separation from one’s body), derealisation (feel-
ing of being detached from the world), selective amnesia and emotional detachment (Lanius,
2015; Radovic and Radovic, 2002).
Traumatic functioning: splitting
In case of trauma, the adoption of dissociation makes it possible for the mind the stay on neg-
ative poles, excluding the awareness of intolerable thoughts and emotions from consciousness.
However, the disconnection of aspects of reality may hide potential dangers and have a high cost.
Therefore, the mind tries to avoid the negative poles B and C, and heads towards the positive
poles A and D, where the perception of reality is not restricted. The space of a traumatic context
can be divided into three zones (Fig. 3-right): the ‘forbidden zone’, an area near a traumatic pole
which cannot be accessed in a non-dissociated state; the ‘free zone’, an area far from all trau-
matic poles (or near the positive poles A and D); the ‘transition zone’, a safety belt around the
forbidden zone.
Let us assume that, in a traumatic context, the mind is initially near pole A. The mind will
stay in the free zone around pole A as long as conditions are prototypical for pole A, i.e. as long as
the object relation is perfect, full of trust, mutual respect, etc. As the situation departs from the
prototypical scenario of pole A and drifts into the transition zone, the mind switches abruptly
to the free zone around pole D. When the situation deviates from the prototypical scenario of
pole D, the mind returns to pole A, and the cycle repeats itself. This corresponds to the defense
mechanism of splitting, defined as the inability to integrate positive and negative aspects of self
and others, which results is a view of the world in ‘black and white’ (Perry et al., 2013).
The transition zone is a safety belt built around the forbidden zone, characterised by high
emotional levels. This causes an increase of the emotional salience of the features involved
in the trauma (link 4 in Fig. 1), which represent the person’s defects criticised. As a result,
these features become the focus of attention and appear magnified and distorted: if the feature
criticised is ‘bat ears’, when looking at the mirror the person will see his/her ears magnified and
more protruded, like in a caricature. The magnification of defects serves the purpose to warn the
executive function that the current situation is close to a traumatic point, and gives an indication
of the features that need to be closely monitored.
This phenomenon is reminiscent of symptoms relevant to a wide range of mental disorders,
starting from the hallucinations, the delusions and, more in general, the ‘delusional atmosphere’
that characterise schizophrenia (Moskowitz et al., 2008). Transitory perceptual distortions or
‘pseudo-hallucinations’ are not uncommon also in personality disorders (Gras et al., 2014). Per-
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Figure 4: Emotional dissociation, dissociative modulatory network. This figure shows a magnification of some of
the modules in Fig. 1. The DM network receives in input cognitive features loaded with salience (green arrow) and
sends modulatory signals (shown in blue) to emotional channels and to cognitive features (4, 7, 8). The effect of
modulation is perceived by the executive module as a restriction of consciousness. Cognitive features are also sent to
the associator (5), which binds them together and stores the new association in episodic memory. The memory record
is complete, including the dissociated components: once the record is recalled from memory, such components are
again dissociated and excluded from consciousness.
ceptual distortions are present in body dysmorphic disorder, which can either appear stand-alone
(Phillips, 2004) or be responsible for the dysmorphic body image associated to eating disorders
(among many other conditions) (Ruffolo et al., 2006).
Selective dissociation
When the mind leaves the transition zone and enters the forbidden zone, dissociation is used to
avoid emotional pain. We can hypothesise that, upon the first occurrence of a trauma, dissocia-
tion is total and involves all mental functions: this may correspond to the ‘freezing’ behaviour of
‘disorganised attached’ children (Main and Solomon, 1986). Total dissociation provides a shield
to pain, but may expose the individual to serious consequences in a potentially dangerous envi-
ronment: for this reason, it cannot be sustained for long periods of time. It is not unrealistic to
assume that, in case of repeated traumas, the mind will try to replace total dissociation through
less pervasive forms of dissociation, able to preserve a reasonable level of functioning.
Selective dissociation is a limited form of dissociation which, near a traumatic situation,
excludes from consciousness some emotional or cognitive channels. This is a common phe-
nomenon. Medical students may be shocked when they see an operation for the first time, but
they rapidly get used to it. The same happens to the medical staff of intensive care units, where
death is a daily occurrence, or to the employees of a slaughterhouse. This happens to all of us,
when we see poor people living in the street and pretend it is normal. We can think of this pro-
cess as of a form of learning, in which the mind selects the smallest subset of reality that needs
to be dissociated to avoid emotional pain without losing touch with the ‘here and now’.
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Figure 5: Classification of situations and patterns of selective dissociation. The DM network classifies the input
composed of cognitive features into a number of classes. For each class, it produces a specific pattern of selective
dissociation, i.e. a combination of attenuation levels for cognitive and emotional channels. Depending on the number
of available neurons, the DM network can learn to map a different number of classes.
The learning of selective dissociation can be obtained through a modulation of links 4, 7
and 8 of Fig. 1, which could be attenuated in certain situations. We hypothesise that this is
achieved through a dedicated dissociative modulatory (DM) network that receives in input
cognitive features loaded with salience and sends modulatory signals to emotional and cognitive
links (Fig. 4). In other words, for each situation, this network decides the degree of attenuation
of each channel. As a result, different classes of situations are selectively mapped to different
attenuation patterns (Fig. 5). The modulated signals are subsequently brought to consciousness,
which is restricted thanks to the effect of modulation.
On the other hand, there is ample evidence for the existence of subconscious, dissociated
memory records, which are denied access to consciousness, but which can re-emerge after a
period of time, when the conditions that justified their suppression have been removed. Painful
memories, such as incest or domestic violence, can be reactivated after many years, when the
person feels safe (e.g. in a therapeutic setting). For these reason, we hypothesise that the records
stored in memory (through link 10) are complete, including the dissociated components. Once
the record is recalled from memory (12), such components are again dissociated and excluded
from consciousness, until the DM network configuration changes.
We further hypothesise that memory records are only composed of cognitive features. Emo-
tions are not recorded in memory, but generated ‘on-the-fly’ based on the set of active features,
once features are activated, through either external input or memory recall. This explains how
the emotions associated to an event can change with time (e.g., painful memories become less
painful as a result of therapy) even though the cognitive memory of the event is unchanged.
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4 Interpretation of schizophrenia
Childhood traumas involving caregivers are often present in the history of persons with schizophre-
nia (Schaefer and Fisher, 2011). As a result, the mental functioning may be altered in key con-
texts such as ‘parent relation’ and ‘romantic relation’ (Fig. 3). In such contexts poles B and C are
difficult to access, and the mind is forced to oscillate between poles A and D (splitting). In the
transition zone, the features involved in the trauma are overloaded with salience and appear
magnified and distorted, like in a caricature: we call such distortions ‘pseudo-hallucinations’.
When the mind gets too close to a traumatic point, selective dissociation should intervene on
specific cognitive and emotional channels, removing disturbing thoughts and turning down the
‘volume’ of bad emotions.
Our hypothesis is that the learning process that leads to selective dissociation is defective
in schizophrenia: dissociation is either too weak or too strong. When it is too weak, painful
emotions are not attenuated, leaving the mind unprotected near the epicentre of the trauma. As
a result, feature distortion caused by excessive salience proceeds unabated and becomes more
pronounced: this is, in our opinion, the nature of hallucinations.
When the self and its associated features are strongly devalued, they are ‘responsible’ for
the shame, guilt or pain experienced (they are the major contributors to the emotion): as such,
they are heavily loaded with salience. In practical terms, this means that such features are ‘pre-
sented’ as important elements, and end up dominating the conscious attention of the subject. In
such conditions, the disabling of the associator (dissociation) is necessary to avoid the establish-
ment of unreliable associations, lacking statistical robustness. If dissociation does not intervene
in a timely manner, salient features, such as the self, run the risk of being associated with ran-
dom features that happen to co-occur. This explains the self-referential nature of delusions in
schizophrenia.
Dissociation eventually intervenes, too strongly. When the dissociation wave hits the brain,
it produces the full spectrum of negative symptoms: emotional detachment, anhedonia, lack of
motivation and thought disorganisation. The degree of dissociation correlates with the severity
of the symptoms observed. Even if the DM network is defective, some learning may still be
expected, leading to a limited progressive improvement over time.
The dopamine hypothesis maintains that hallucinations and delusions are caused by an ex-
cess of salience, in turn driven by an excess of dopamine in the limbic system. Most antipsychotic
drugs block the dopamine receptor: this lowers the level of dopamine, reduces ‘aberrant’ salience
and eliminates the positive symptoms. However, based on our model, the excess of dopamine
is not due to a malfunction of the salience module, but it is caused by too intense emotional
levels, left undissociated by a defective DM network. An intervention on dopamine blocks the
salience mechanism in all situations and lead to an abnormal functioning of the brain, which
may exacerbate the negative symptoms.
It is not unreasonable to think that the classification power of the DM network (the number
of classes that can be discriminated) depends on the number of neurons in the network. A
typical example of classification task in the field of artificial neural networks is the classification
of handwritten digits (see Fig. 6). In this case, the neural network receives in input the image
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Figure 6: Classification of handwritten digits. The Mnist dataset, used in machine learning for visual classification
tasks, contains 60000 examples of handwritten characters belonging to 10 classes (0-9).
of the character and produces in output an integer number in the [0,9] range representing the
class.
In order to effectively solve a given classification task, an artificial neural network must
have a sufficient number of neurons. If the number of neurons is too low, the classification will
be inaccurate (e.g. a ‘2’ will be misclassfied as a ‘4’). The number of neurons required depends on
the complexity of the task, which in turn depends on the dimensionality of the input (the number
of pixels in the case of images) and the dimensionality of the output (the number of classes).
Our conjecture is that, in schizophrenia, the DM network has an insufficient number of neu-
rons. As a result, the classification ability of the DM network is poor. Instead of providing a
customised dissociational pattern for each traumatic point, the DM network is only able to gen-
erate a few distinct patterns. It is as though we tried to fit all feet sizes with only two shoe
measures, 38 and 45: for some feet, the shoe will be too large, for other feet it will be too small
(for very few, it will be ok). Likewise, for some situations the dissociational pattern will be too
weak, producing positive symptoms, for other situations it will be too strong, producing negative
symptoms.
The hypothesised reduced number of neurons in the DM network correlates with the obser-
vation of structural changes to the hippocampus frequently observed in schizophrenia (Heckers
and Konradi, 2010) (it is reasonable to assume that the DM network is located near the hip-
pocampus). The hippocampus of schizophrenic subjects is significantly smaller and seems to be
less susceptible to the phenomenon of habituation (Williams et al., 2013), which could be neces-
sary to develop selective dissociation. These observations led to the hypothesis of psychosis as a
learning and memory problem (Tamminga, 2013), coherent with our theory.
Several environmental non-trauma-linked factors, such as difficulties during birth, or the
use of drugs, are correlated with schizophrenia. The level of heritability is high: if a twin has
schizophrenia, the probability that also the other twin has it is 50%. Overall, there is evidence
that, besides traumatic experiences, biological, genetic or neurodevelopmental factors play a role
in the pathogenesis of schizophrenia: our hypothesis is that all these factors act by reducing the
number of neurons in the DM network. This represents a predisposition that requires the action
of traumas to be realised. The accumulation rate of traumatic events is expected to be constant
in the course of life and to accelerate during adolescence, which is acknowledged to be a stressful
period. This would explain why schizophrenia has its onset during adolescence.
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5 Conclusions
The objective of this work was to propose a functional model of the mind and provide a new
interpretation for schizophrenia. The model evidences the interplay between environmental
causes and neurobiological predisposition in the generation of the schizophrenic phenotype. The
environmental contribution consists in the presence of significant traumas, while the intrinsic
susceptibility depends on the inability of the DM network to generate a sufficient number of
customised dissociation patterns, to counteract the effect of traumas in all situations. Future
work will be aimed to further develop the model and draw from it insights useful for therapy.
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